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Human history has been marked by social instability and conflict, often driven by the irreconcil-
ability of opposing sets of beliefs, ideologies, and religious dogmas. The dynamics of belief systems
has been studied mainly from two distinct perspectives, namely how cognitive biases lead to indi-
vidual belief rigidity and how social influence leads to social conformity. Here we propose a unifying
framework that connects cognitive and social forces together in order to study the dynamics of so-
cietal belief evolution. Each individual is endowed with a network of interacting beliefs that evolves
through interaction with other individuals in a social network. The adoption of beliefs is affected
by both internal coherence and social conformity. Our framework may offer explanations for how
social transitions can arise in otherwise homogeneous populations, how small numbers of zealots
with highly coherent beliefs can overturn societal consensus, and how belief rigidity protects fringe
groups and cults against invasion from mainstream beliefs, allowing them to persist and even thrive
in larger societies. Our results suggest that strong consensus may be insufficient to guarantee social
stability, that the cognitive coherence of belief-systems is vital in determining their ability to spread,
and that coherent belief-systems may pose a serious problem for resolving social polarization, due
to their ability to prevent consensus even under high levels of social exposure. We argue that the
inclusion of cognitive factors into a social model could provide a more complete picture of collective
human dynamics.
INTRODUCTION
Ideological conflict has been a major challenge for hu-
man societies [1]. For instance, when post World-War
I Germany was marked by economic depression and so-
cial trauma, ideological fringe groups like the National-
Socialist Party and the Communist Party of Germany
made their way into mainstream politics to eventually
dominate the political landscape [2–4]. This process
of ideological upheaval eventually led to World War II,
one of the deadliest conflicts in human history. Simi-
larly, 14th and 15th century Europe was torn by sharp
religious transitions and accompanying widespread con-
flicts, such as the Thirty Years’ War [5]. The abundance
of such ideological transitions in history raises questions:
are they driven by common psycho-social mechanisms?
Do specific peculiarities of human psychology play a role
in ideological dynamics?
Although these questions have been tackled by numer-
ous studies, most existing models of belief system dynam-
ics focus on either social or cognitive factors rather than
integrating both aspects. Social models focus on how so-
cial interactions transmit and shape beliefs. For instance,
Axelrod’s cultural dissemination model considers social
influence and homophily as key drivers of cultural polar-
ization (see Fig. 1(a)) [6, 7]. In this model each agent is
represented as a vector of independent traits that can be
modified through social influence. The study of spin sys-
tems in physics have inspired a number of opinion mod-
els, such as the voter model [8–10], Sznajd model [11–13],
and Ising-like models [14]. Other approaches have drawn
upon reaction-diffusion systems [15], or may use contin-
uous opinions [16] or bounded-confidence [17].
Cognitive modeling approaches mainly focus on
information processing and decision making (see
Fig. 1(b)) [18]. Psychological research has revealed that
individuals strive for internal consistency, which leads to
cognitive mechanisms such as confirmation bias [19] and
cognitive dissonance [20]. Our understanding of these
cognitive forces and biases in belief formation allow us
to move beyond the underlying assumptions—a set of
independent beliefs [21, 22]—of spin models or opinion
vector-based models [23, 24].
Recent attempts to combine these forces have used
mechanisms like social- and anti-conformity [13], founda-
tional beliefs [25], confirmation bias [26], attitudes [27],
and social network formation [28–30]. However, modeling
belief-systems that consist of interacting beliefs, and the
study of such systems under social influence, has not been
fully investigated. Here we introduce a novel framework
that can incorporate both social and cognitive factors in
a coherent way (see Fig. 1(c)). We show that the integra-
tion of social and cognitive factors produces elementary
features of collective social phenomena—societal transi-
tions, upheavals, and existence of fringe groups.
Our framework represents a society as a network
of individuals—a social network—where each individ-
ual possesses a network of concepts and beliefs. Social
influence takes place via the social ties [8, 31–33] and
each individual carries a belief network of interconnected
relationships that represents the individual’s belief sys-
tem [20, 24, 34–38]. We evaluate the internal coherence
of each individual’s belief network by applying the bal-
ance theory [39, 40]. The coherence shifts an individ-
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2FIG. 1. Cognitive-Social Belief Model (a) Social models,
such as the voter or Sznajd models, focus on the assimilation
process through social pressure. Beliefs are usually simplified
as independent states. (b) Cognitive models, such as the SKS
model, focus on the interaction and coherence of beliefs of
a single individual and how individuals make decisions and
change their minds. The effect of social networks is often
unaddressed. (c) Our model incorporates both forces, recog-
nizing not only social pressures but also the connected nature
of human beliefs. The social network acts as a conduit for
belief transmission between individuals. We model a belief
as a signed relationship between two concepts. We express
the internal coherence of a network of such beliefs in terms of
social balance theory where relationship triads can be either
stable or unstable. The belief networks evolve over time as
individuals decide whether to accept new beliefs transmitted
by their peers.
ual’s willingness to integrate new beliefs, thus simulating
cognitive traits such as confirmation bias and cognitive
dissonance [18, 19, 23, 31–33]. At the same time, an in-
dividual’s belief network is affected by social influence;
repeated exposure to new ideas through social ties [41–
44] increases their likelihood of adopting even incongru-
ent ideas. Individuals thus experience both cognitive and
social forces: (i) they prefer to have coherent belief net-
works and prefer beliefs that will increase their internal
coherence; but (ii) may accept conflicting beliefs under
the influence of strong social pressure.
METHODS
Our approach considers a network of concepts and be-
liefs where the nodes represent concepts and signed edges
between them represents binary associative beliefs that
capture the relation between two concepts (cf. Social
Knowledge Structure (SKS) model [34]). This formula-
tion allows us to define internal coherence through the
principle of triad stability in social balance theory [45–
48].
For instance, consider the beliefs of Alice, who is a de-
voted spectator of soccer. The Eagles are her favorite
soccer team, but it has been charged with match fixing.
In Alice’s belief network there is a positive link between
the Eagles and soccer, and between the Eagles and match
fixing, while there is a negative link between soccer and
match fixing. Such pressured configurations are consid-
ered unstable (incoherent), and are analogous to frus-
trated states in spin-systems or unstable social triads.
To resolve the frustration Alice may dissociate the Ea-
gles from the allegations of match fixing, drop the Eagles’
association with the sport, or change the relationship be-
tween soccer and match fixing. It has been shown that
people tend to quickly resolve such inconsistency when
provided the opportunity to choose dissonance reduction
strategies [49]. Yet, in the presence of social pressure or
more complicated concept associations, a concept may
remain pressured. Each triad in a belief network can be
either stable or unstable, as shown in Fig. 1(c). The in-
coherence of an entire belief system (of individual n) can
thus be captured by an internal energy function [50] on
the belief network M:
E(i)n = −
1(
M
3
) ∑
j,k,l
ajkaklajl, (1)
where M is the number of nodes in the belief network and
ajk is the association connecting nodes j and k, which can
be +1 (positive association) or −1 (negative association).
The sum is taken over all triads in the belief network and
normalized by the total number of triads. For simplicity,
in our simulations we choose this network to be complete,
meaning that all concepts have a positive or negative
association with every other concept.
A single association’s contribution to the energy de-
pends on the state of adjacent associations, providing in-
terdependence and rigidity to the belief system. Beliefs
do not necessarily reflect reality. They may be fabricated
or completely false. It is, however, the interaction be-
tween beliefs that gives them their strength, reflective of
psychological factors like confirmation bias and cognitive
dissonance.
The evolution of belief systems is also driven by social
interactions, through which people communicate their
beliefs to others. We represent this society as a social
3network, N, where N = |N|, and whose nodes are indi-
viduals and edges represent social relationships through
which ideas are communicated. We define a second, “so-
cial” energy term, inspired by energy in the spin-based
models which captures the degree of alignment between
connected individuals. The ‘local’ social energy that an
individual n ∈ N feels can be defined by:
E(s)n = −
1
kmax
(
M
2
) ∑
q∈Γ(n)
~Sn · ~Sq, (2)
where the sum is taken over the set of n’s neighbors in
N, denoted by Γ(n). ~S is a belief state vector where each
element corresponds to an edge in the belief network, so
|~S| = (M2 ). kmax is a normalization constant that bounds
the strength of peer-influence and is equal to the maxi-
mum degree of N. Alternatively, it could be replaced by
a function that specifies the scaling relationship between
exposure and the individual’s energy. For our simulations
everyone possesses the same set of concepts (nodes) so M
is the same for each person.
We combine the internal energy with the social energy
for all individuals to define the total energy as follows:
H =
∑
n∈N
[
JE(i)n + IE
(s)
n
]
(3)
where the last sum is taken over all nodes on the net-
work. The parameters J and I, which we refer to as the
coherentism and peer-influence respectively, control the
relative contribution of the internal energy and the social
energy to the total. The dynamics is dominated by in-
ternal belief coherence if J  I and by social consensus
when I  J .
Each individual is endowed with their own internal be-
lief network and may transfer some of their beliefs to their
social contacts. A receiver of a belief either accepts the
incoming belief or not based on the context of their own
belief system (internal coherency) and similarity to their
neighbors (social conformity). A belief is more likely to
be accepted if it increases the coherence of an individual’s
own belief system, social pressure will also increase the
odds of a belief being accepted, even if it conflicts with
their belief system.
We implement these ideas by creating the following
rules: at each time step t, a random pair of connected
individuals is chosen and one of the individuals (sender)
randomly chooses a belief (association) from its internal
belief system and sends it to the other individual (re-
ceiver), as illustrated in Fig. 1(c). We assume that each
individual has an identical set of concept nodes. Fig-
ure 1(c) shows the selection and emission process on a
graph. The receiver accepts the association if it decreases
their individual energy: Hn = JE
(i)
n + IE
(s)
n . Even if the
change in energy is less than zero, ∆Hn > 0, the receiver
may still accept with the probability of e
−∆Hn
T . This term
is analogous to the Boltzmann factor [51]. T , which we
refer to as susceptibility, serves a similar purpose as tem-
perature in physical systems for the belief network. As
T increases, an individual is more likely to accept their
neighbor’s opinions that conflict with their own.
We characterize the status of the whole society by
defining two global energy functions. First, the mean
individual energy 〈E(i)〉 measures the average internal
coherence of individuals. It is expressed by the following
equation:
〈E(i)〉 = 1
N
∑
n∈N
E(i)n . (4)
The average is taken over the energies of all individuals
and it can take values between +1 and −1. 〈E(i)〉 = −1
means that every individual in the society possesses a
completely coherent belief system, with no pressured be-
liefs. The other extreme (+1) represents a society where
every individual has completely incoherent beliefs.
Yet, this measure does not give us any indication of
how homogeneous a society is, as belief systems can vary
widely while still being coherent. We have a second en-
ergy measure inspired from spin systems:
〈E(s)〉 = 1
N
∑
n∈N
E(s)n , (5)
which is minimized if the society is in consensus.
For each simulation we use Erdo¨s-Re`nyi graphs with
N = 104 nodes and average degree of 5, though similar
results are found for 2D lattices. The belief network was
fully connected with M = 5.
RESULTS
Most opinion models exhibit a phase transition from a
disordered state to an ordered one [8], where the ordered
state represents consensus. As our model includes the
two conflicting forces—personal belief rigidity and social
influence—we first ask how the relative strength of these
two forces governs consensus dynamics.
Through social interaction, the society may or may not
reach a consensus, depending upon the relative strength
of peer-influence (I) and coherentism (J). Figure 2 shows
a set of phase diagrams for various combinations of J , I,
and T . S/N is defined as the belief system with the
largest number of constituents normalized by the size of
the social network. Density in Figure 2(d)-(f) is the prob-
ability density of S/N over 160 trials at a given param-
eter configuration. Since belief systems evolve locally,
individuals may have to pass through incoherent states
before fully converting. As the coherentism (J) increases
individuals tend to cling to their own beliefs rather than
make such incoherent transitions. This can prevent con-
sensus, but small local consensus can still occur. As the
susceptibility (T ) increases individuals readily accept in-
coherent beliefs, allowing individuals to traverse through
4the belief space. It facilitates spreading of ideas and con-
sensus. By making individuals more susceptible to be-
lief spreading rather than to random switching, T plays
the opposite role to temperature in standard spin mod-
els [8]. T acts as a temperature for individual’s beliefs,
and as an inverse-temperature for the whole system. As
the peer-influence (I) increases individuals again become
more prone to consensus. Novel dynamics occur when the
effect of coherentism and social influence become com-
parable. Figure 2(b) shows that complete consensus is
not guaranteed when the forces exerted by J and I re-
main comparable in size. The competition leads to a
situation where belief systems can coexist and where less
coherent systems can dominate. In Figure 2(d)-(e), we
see examples of these competing configurations for when
T or J is decreased and I held constant, as denoted by
the higher density of largest belief-systems around 0.5.
In these cases there are usually two (sometimes more)
larger competing belief systems that cannot completely
dominate the system even after a very long time (hun-
dreds of billions of time-steps). As noted in [50] there are
local minima distributed throughout belief space where
an individual’s belief system can get stuck. At lower
temperatures and when the drive for internal coherence
(J) is much smaller than I, then groups of individuals
(sometimes the whole population) can collectively be-
come stuck in these jammed states. Under these condi-
tions convergence to a completely coherent belief system
is not guaranteed.
In our model the energy contribution of belief networks
can have a major impact on system stability as individ-
uals seek more coherent beliefs and resolve dissonance.
What happens when key beliefs are upset through an
external shock or perturbation?
Imagine two independent systems, both homogeneous
with the same social energy, E(s). In traditional social
models, with the absence of the individual belief system
(cognitive factor), these systems are identical. By con-
trast, the internal system of interconnected beliefs intro-
duces a new force that drives people to seek coherence
in the structure of their own belief systems. Given a
homogeneous population of people with highly coherent
belief systems, society remains stable. However, given
a homogeneous population of incoherent belief systems,
society will become unstable and following a small per-
turbation, breaks down (see Fig. 3). In our simulation,
the society is initialized at consensus with an incoherent
belief system. Then 1% of the population are given a
random belief system. Individuals attempt to reduce the
energy of their own belief systems and leave consensus.
This society eventually re-converges at a more coherent
belief-system that is different from the original consensus
(Fig. 3(c)). In the model, consensus does not guarantee
stability.
These social instabilities may help explain why new
ideologies can arise in the presence of belief systems that
dominate most of the population. Traumatic events such
as war or depression could make previously coherent be-
liefs less coherent, thereby destabilizing the belief system
as a whole. Since these beliefs are shared by the over-
whelming majority, this perturbation has the potential to
have widespread impact. Such changes may reduce the
internal coherence of individuals, which may make the
whole society more prone to paradigm shifts. Through-
out history, major external perturbations in the form of
war, depression, and crippling inflation has frequently
disrupted the world-views of a society’s citizens, induc-
ing subsequent social upheavals. More coherent belief
systems, which otherwise fail to gain adherents in the
presence of a dominant stable societal values, could then
gain the upper-hand by recruiting among a population of
disturbed citizens as Hoffer suggests [2].
Given that the coherence of personal beliefs fundamen-
tally impacts collective behavior, we investigate the im-
pact of “true believers” or zealots in a population. They
can play an important role in shaping collective social dy-
namics [2, 8]. Zealots were introduced in [52] and [53] in
the context of the voter model. Since, there has been
continued work on the impact of zealots in the voter
model [54–56] as well as binary adoption [57], naming
game [58, 59], and other social models [60, 61]. The re-
lated topic of minority spreading has also been explored
in various opinion models [62–64]. Here we explore this
aspect of opinion dynamics from the perspective of cog-
nitive forces acting on the agents. In the context of our
framework we define zealots as individuals who will never
alter their own belief systems, but will continue to at-
tempt to convert others to their own.
To study the impact of zealots, we prepare a homo-
geneous society with highly coherent beliefs and intro-
duce zealots with varying internal coherence. As seen in
studies of previous social models, there is a tipping-point
density above which the minority opinion takes over the
population. Figure 4 shows that the internal coherence
of zealots has a strong impact on their effectiveness in
converting society. Low coherence zealots require much
higher densities in order to convert the whole popula-
tion (see squares in Fig. 4) because converted individuals
revert back to more coherent belief-systems at a higher
rate, making it difficult for the zealot’s belief-system to
retain converts. Highly coherent zealots pull the whole
population out of consensus and convert it to their belief-
systems more easily. Coherent zealots require almost half
the density, in this particular case, to convert the entire
population. This suggests that coherence of a set of be-
liefs plays a vital role in determining how well the set of
beliefs spread through society.
Our model may offer a possible explanation for the co-
existence of many seemingly invalid or impractical cults
and fringe groups in our society. The beliefs of cults and
other fringe groups may frequently contradict reality, yet
they continue to thrive in spite of being surrounded by
5FIG. 2. Phase space (a-c) Phase diagrams of various combinations of the three parameters J , I, and T . Along with
corresponding slices through the phase space as indicated by the dashed red lines (bottom row). (a,d) peer-influence I and
susceptibility T conflict creating a regime where multiple belief systems with various coherences can coexist. We see a similar
regime appear in (b, e) where peer-influence and coherentism contend for dominance. More traditional disorder-to-order
transitions as in other opinion models also take place when I is small and fixed (c, f). S/N is the fractional size of the largest
group. ER graphs with N = 104 nodes and average degree of 5 were used. The density was calculated from a 160 trails per
point. The belief network was fully connected with M = 5.
large majorities of other belief systems. In our model,
this is explained by the degree to which the coherence of
belief systems can out-balance social pressure in addition
to social isolation.
To investigate the influence of belief rigidity and so-
cial isolation on social dynamics we create a society with
two communities, a large mainstream community and
a smaller cult community (Fig. 5(a)). The mainstream
community acts like a reservoir of mainstream beliefs.
The other community consists of people following a dif-
ferent coherent belief system. By controlling social ex-
posure and the strength of belief coherence, we investi-
gate what effect belief coherence has on the capacity for
mainstream society to invade the cult. The parameter µ
controls the fraction of edges in the cult community that
are shared with the mainstream community [65]. When
socially isolated (low µ) the cult can resist invasion re-
gardless of mainstream coherence (Fig. 5(b)). Groups of
like-minded individuals can resist outside influence by re-
ducing social contact with non-members (decreasing µ)
and enhancing internal social interactions, both of which
are common in many fringe groups and even in religious
communities. On the other hand, the internal coherence
also plays a key role. Less coherent mainstream beliefs
have greater difficulty in converting the cult, even at high
levels of exposure (high µ). Compared with the dogma of
cults, the truth or the reality can be more complex and
less coherent. In such case, even a belief-system firmly
grounded on truth may struggle to convert cults that pos-
sess a highly coherent set of beliefs. Interlocked beliefs
turns tightly-knit communities into bastions of resistance
to ideological invasion from outside.
Figure 6(a) shows a phase diagram of the case when
I  J , where conversion is determined solely by social
exposure (µ). This is expected by most spin-based so-
cial models. However, if the strength of social influence
is comparable to belief strength, social exposure is not
the sole determinant anymore (see Fig. 6(b)). Notably,
by increasing the coherentism (J) of its members and
maintaining a coherent set of beliefs, cults can continue
to thrive even with complete mixing with society. This
contradicts, while underlining common intuition, the tra-
ditional exposure models where enough exposure is suf-
ficient to convert populations. These results also hint
6FIG. 3. Belief driven social instability. Strong societal
consensus does not guarantee a stable society in our model. If
major paradigm shifts occur and make individual belief sys-
tems incoherent, then society may become unstable. (a) The
plot shows the evolution of social energy E(s) over time. The
system starts at consensus but with incoherent beliefs. After
introducing a small perturbation, individuals leave consen-
sus, searching for more coherent sets of beliefs, until society
re-converges at a stable configuration. (b) Decreasing mean
individual energies 〈E(i)〉 over time illustrates individual sta-
bilization during societal transition. (c) 〈S/N〉 is the frac-
tional group size. As society is upset, the original dominant
but incoherent belief system So (solid black) is replaced by
an emerging coherent alternative Sf (dashed red).
at common characteristics of surviving cults. We do not
expect to find successful cults that have low belief coher-
ence and high mixing because they would be quickly con-
verted by the mainstream society. We expect to see more
cults that utilize a combination of policies that minimize
their member’s social contacts with outsiders, emphasize
the importance of their dogma (increasing J), and max-
imizing the coherence of their beliefs. The latter could
mean incorporating explanations for beliefs that contra-
dict empirical evidence or belittling mainstream methods
of reasoning. Coherence can be, but is not necessarily
aligned with logical consistency, rather coherence is based
on the strength of associations between concepts and va-
lence concepts (see SKS model [34]), that is derived from
a connectionist cognitive framework.
FIG. 4. Impact of the internal consistency of zealot
beliefs. We define zealots as a group of individuals who share
an identical, immutable belief system. Such belief systems
can, however, vary in terms of their coherency. The dynamics
of 〈S/N〉, the fractional size of the zealot population, over
ρo, the density of zealots introduced into the population, re-
veals that zealots with more coherent beliefs can convert a
population much more efficiently. In converting the whole
population, the coherent set of beliefs (circles) require only
less than half the density of zealots compared with incoher-
ent beliefs (squares). Bars show standard error and Ez is the
energy of the zealot’s belief-system. The simulations were run
using J = 2.0, T = 2.0 and I = 90.0.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that our model exhibits a disorder-to-
order transition similar to other opinion models, while
also exhibiting unique dynamics that could help explain
common processes observed in the real world, such as the
breakdown of a homogeneous society driven by shocks to
individuals’ beliefs, the dependence of zealotry on be-
lief coherence, and the successful entrenchment of fringe
groups. Each of these results arises from the fact that our
framework integrates belief interdependence with social
influence.
The breakdown of homogeneous societies can manifest
through changes in the connectivity of concepts at the
concept-network level (cf. SKS model). Abrupt shocks
to these conceptual connections can impact the coher-
ence of beliefs. That impact is reflected in our model as
an unstable belief system. When people share a com-
mon shock, one could expect that many of those people’s
belief-systems will enter a frustrated state. In order for
this socially frustrated state to be resolved, members of
the population partake in societal-dissonance resolution
strategies by collectively transitioning toward more co-
herent belief systems. From this view we could interpret
paradigm shifts in culture as something akin to a societal-
wide coping strategy.
Our model is a minimalistic approach toward intro-
7FIG. 5. Belief Invasion (a) The survival of cults and fringe groups depends on the coherence and strength of beliefs. We
create a network with two communities with parameters T = 2.0, I = 0.09, and J = 2.0—putting the system in a regime where
it will seek consensus. We vary the fraction of links that connect the cult community to the mainstream community, denoted
µ. eo is the number of social links between communities and
∑
ki is the total number of links in the cult (both shared and
internal). The mainstream community attempts to convert the smaller cult. (b) At low µ the lack of exposure allows the cult
to resist mainstream conversion. At higher µ there is sufficient exposure to the mainstream community to overcome the rigidity
of the cult’s belief system. However, the process of conversion becomes more difficult as the cult’s beliefs become more coherent
than mainstream beliefs. Cults are easily converted with highly coherent mainstream beliefs even at low exposure levels (black
circles), while cults maintain their beliefs even at high exposure given low coherence of mainstream beliefs (red squares). Bars
show standard deviation.
FIG. 6. Community and belief rigidity (a) Exposure
determines conversion resistance when peer-influence (I) is
strong. (b) Fringe groups can sustain their beliefs, even at a
very high level of social exposure, with high levels of individ-
ual coherentism (J).
ducing individualist concept-networks into a systematic
social dynamics model. Though simple, the framework
can be expanded to include more realistic features. For
instance, communicated beliefs are chosen randomly, but
this feature can be replaced with other models of be-
lief communication, such as imitation, where someone
will be more likely to communicate recently accepted be-
liefs. Additionally, our mapping from the SKS concept
model could be expanded to included weighted relation-
ships that emphasize the uncertainty that an individual
has in their beliefs (conviction) and its relations to other
beliefs. While we used the same parameter values (J ,
I, and T ) for all individuals, we expect them to vary
within the population from person to person. Variations
of these parameters could produce the natural occurrence
of zealot-like behavior. Finally, the formation and main-
tenance of social ties is an important facet of social dy-
namics [66, 67] and could be implemented by allowing
agents to choose their neighbors [68].
Our model expands upon previous social models by im-
plementing an internal belief system that assumes that
the interdependence among beliefs shapes their dynam-
ics. In this framework we are able to incorporate known
psychological forces into the model and show that a
bottom-up approach can successfully link micro-level be-
haviors to global dynamics. By making this small jump
to using internal belief-systems, while preserving key fea-
tures of standard social models, such as percolation and
global consensus, it extends their dynamics and explana-
tory value, and could be a contributing factor for ex-
plaining the entrenchment of belief systems and social
upheaval. Future work will be directed towards the de-
velopment of new opinion models for specific applications
that more closely integrate our behavioral and cognitive
understanding of humanity.
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